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namely—1,227,890 and 1,406,180, are obtained as the number of enrollments made; the last number Colonel Livermore considers probably too high, and believes that the mean between the two, namely—1,317,035, will come nearer to the actual number of enrollments made.

By converting the terms of service for which men were enrolled, into terms actually served by them, deeming the war to have closed May 4, 1865, without regarding deaths, desertions, etc., and reducing the total of these terms to a standard term of three years, the number of enrollments made in the Union and Confederate armies is found to be equal, respectively, to 1,536,678 and 1,082,119 men who actually served three years.

The number of Confederates who were killed or died of wounds received in action is estimated at 94,000, and those who died of disease at at least 164,000, making a total loss by death of at least 258,000.

Colonel Livermore presents his subject in clear and simple language, and in a soldierly and most impartial manner, and is to be congratulated on his success. His work is of intrinsic value, and will no doubt be accepted by every intelligent survivor of the Civil War, whether Confederate or Union; there is nothing but honor in its pages for all. The collector of war literature and statistics should and will prize the book highly and the layman will find it interesting and instructive reading.

The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War. By JOHN FISKE. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. Pp. xxvi, 368.)

It goes without saying that *The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War*, by John Fiske, is an unusually interesting and readable book. Mr. Fiske could not write a dull book on any subject, and the matters with which he deals in this one, and in his very best manner, might command attentive perusal although treated by the prosiest writers. The book has some minor faults, or what seem to be such in the judgment of those who do not sympathize with the author in the sentiment with which he regards the causes and conduct of the great struggle. Such readers cannot help thinking him at times essentially, although perhaps unconsciously, partisan. Of partizanship in any offensive sense, or to a degree which is positively misleading, no one who is not himself unduly influenced by prejudice will accuse him; and it is evident that he has striven to be fair in his estimate not only of the events, but of the actors he writes of. Nevertheless he occasionally uses language which, while not appreciably impairing the value of his work as a military treatise, or its historical accuracy, yet does a certain injustice, produces a wrong impression, and reflects on some of the Confederate officers mentioned, in a way that is neither warranted nor generous. It is certainly not fair to style a Confederate cavalry leader a "guerilla," merely because he has performed a special kind of service with more than ordinary enterprise and efficiency. During the war period that term was applied, both in the North and the South, to men who were not soldiers at all, but

bandits and marauders, and a great many people still so understand it. Nor is it at all accurate to liken the operations of the raiding cavalry of the Confederacy to the guerilla warfare at one time conducted in certain countries of Europe. The resemblance, if there be any, is too slight to be considered ; and that the term is used as one of reproach is best shown by the fact that Mr. Fiske never employs it in describing similar service performed by the Federal cavalry.

He is guilty of a similar "unjust discrimination," when he characterizes Albert Pike as "an adventurer from Massachusetts." Pike migrated to Arkansas when barely twenty-one years old, and had lived in the South for thirty years when the Civil War began. He was eminent at the bar and in many ways, was a man of high character and social position, and was perfectly convinced of the justice of the cause for which he fought. It may be that the appellation of "rebel" is properly bestowed on all who served the Confederacy, whether born in the North or the South, but there is no more reason to style Albert Pike "an adventurer from Massachusetts," than to term General George H. Thomas an adventurer from Virginia.

So seldom, however, does Mr. Fiske err in this regard and so venial are his lapses from a really impartial account of the events he relates, that we might not observe them if the general tone of his narration were not so free from acrimony and any trace of illiberal temper that the slightest suggestion of such feeling, upon his part, jars us more than bucketsful of abuse from some other war-historians.

While one who has himself seen service in the field may detect in this book evidences of the lack of such experience in its author, it is quite as true that no mere soldier could have written it nearly so well. This is not simply because of the vivid, graphic, picturesque style in which the story is told, and the absence of that dry, technical and unnecessary detail which makes so much of purely military narrative tedious and difficult of appreciative attention, but because of the very lucid and comprehensive method in which the subject matter is presented.

A very large subject, embracing a number of parts having a close but not apparent connection, is treated with a logical arrangement and power of explicit statement which only an unusually acute and incisive writer, accustomed to consider and discuss a great variety of topics, could command. Mr. Fiske's previous studies and work in other departments of literature, were unquestionably of value to him when he undertook the task of military criticism.

The book is a story, as its title imports, of military operations during the Civil War in the states of Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana, conducted in a field stretching from the Ohio and Missouri rivers to the Gulf, and from the Mississippi river to the western prairies, in the one direction, and to the mountains of east Tennessee in the other. It describes the embryonic organization on both sides, and the partially purposeless, totally futile effort put forth by each in the beginning of the conflict. It recites the earlier struggles of raw,

undisciplined troops and untrained commanders, occurring contemporaneously but without any concert or understanding, throughout the vast region wherein, according to the mathesis of war, there should have been intelligent co-operation and linked, sustained endeavor; and it shows how, when finally such intelligent direction and energy was furnished, the overwhelming power of the North broke down the desperate resistance, but feebler resources of the South. Commencing with the abortive attempts of those in sympathy with the South to take Kentucky and Missouri into the Confederacy, and the petty skirmishes which marked incipient hostilities, it concludes with the tremendous battles and vast campaigns which shattered the Confederate strength and prestige in the West.

Mr. Fiske has given an exceedingly clear and comprehensive account of how the superior numbers and material, at all times possessed but not always properly applied by the Federal commanders, were ultimately utilized and rendered effective. The justice of his criticism of some of the commanders, on both sides, and his estimate of the relative importance of some of the minor actions and movements he narrates may, perhaps, be disputed; and his statements regarding the comparative numerical strength of the contending armies in the greater battles—that perennial subject of controversy—will, of course, be challenged. But, in the main, his account is not only explicit and coherent but convincing. There are few who will not agree with him that Halleck's retention in chief command of the Union armies paralyzed their efficiency in the West, and that success became possible only when Grant and his able subordinates were given a free hand.

No writer has so well shown how conducive, indispensable indeed, to Federal success was the service performed by the Federal fleets on the inland waters. But for the aid so rendered in the matter of transportation, and the part taken by the gun-boats in many offensive operations wherein the military and naval efforts were combined, the Union arms would never have completely triumphed in the valley of the Mississippi. Efficient naval co-operation assured the reduction of the forts which guarded the Tennessee and the Cumberland, whose capture forced Albert Sidney Johnston's premature abandonment of the line of the Cumberland and the fertile region of middle Tennessee. It compelled also the evacuation of all the formidable defenses of the upper Mississippi. To Farragut's daring passage of Forts Jackson and St. Philip was solely due the early fall of New Orleans; and the use of the lower Mississippi and the Red river opened the trans-Mississippi to Federal occupation. The army of Rosecrans, cooped up in Chattanooga after the battle of Chickamauga, and the reinforcements brought by Grant to its assistance, would have been compelled to disastrous retreat if supplies had not been furnished by water craft plying the Tennessee river; and the subsequent march to Atlanta and from Atlanta to the sea might have been indefinitely postponed, or have never been made. Undoubtedly the two most interesting chapters of the book are those entitled "The Vicksburg Problem" and "The

Fall of Vicksburg," in which the author describes how Grant sought to wrest from the Confederates control of the two hundred and fifty miles of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, whereby they maintained communication with their territory west of the great river.

Any narrative of these operations must furnish a remarkable testimonial to the skill, resource and extraordinary tenacity of the great captain, and to the patience and endurance of the troops he commanded; but the story has never before been told so graphically and with such power as Mr. Fiske tells it, and its interest is greatly enhanced by the description of the part taken by the fleet.

The conditions, especially topographical, under which the war in the West was conducted, permitted and demanded strategic operations on a grand scale to a greater extent than was possible or necessary in the region wherein the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia confronted each other. The much smaller area in which these armies operated, and the less number of objective points whose seizure promised strategic advantages, limited their capacity in this regard, and required instead skillful, tactical maneuvering which might enable battle to be delivered at advantage. But in the valley of the Mississippi, penetrated in all directions by navigable streams connecting with each other, traversed centrally by railroad lines affording both means for offensive operations and ready communication over great distances, and full of objective points inviting attack and demanding defense because their capture or loss involved far-reaching consequences—in this vast field, opportunity was offered for the exercise of strategic ability of the highest order. Mr. Fiske has exhibited, in brief compass, but very clearly, this feature of the conflict.

BASIL W. DUKE.

Military Reminiscences of the Civil War. By General JACOB D. COX. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1900. Two vols., pp. xvii, 549; xvi, 596.)

Few if any volumes pertaining to the Civil War equal these in interest. They cover not only the military features of campaigns, but interwoven with these are incidents and the personal and political features attending the movements. The whole flows smoothly on in the scholarly and agreeable style of which General Cox was a master. He had wide experience in the war, having been prominent in the three months' service in West Virginia, in Pope's campaign, in the Antietam, Knoxville, Atlanta, and Nashville campaigns, and, at last, before Wilmington, and in the final operations against Johnston in North Carolina. His was, therefore, a wide field of observation, and his relations to the leading commanders were such as to give him exceptional advantages.

The chapter on the outbreak of the war vividly recalls the rush and the unanimity with which the North, without regard to party, accepted the challenge at Sumter. The details of mobilization at Camp Denni-